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Myth: Pod Security Admission enforces security on running Pods

During a production security review, a team proudly stated:

“We’ve enabled Pod Security Admission with restricted mode. All insecure Pods are blocked now.”

Out of curiosity, we listed running Pods across namespaces—and found multiple Pods still running with:

  • privileged: true

  • hostPath mounts

  • hostNetwork: true

When asked why those Pods still existed, the answer was simple and confident:

“PSA will take care of them.”

That assumption is far more common than people realize.

Why This Myth Exists?​

  1. The word “enforces” is misleading

    Enforcement sounds continuous, but PSA enforcement is event-based, not runtime-based.

  2. Confusion with runtime security tools

    Tools like Falco, SELinux, AppArmor, or eBPF-based detectors act at runtime. PSA does not.

  3. Pod Security Policy (PSP) legacy expectations

    PSP was often misunderstood as a runtime control, and that misconception carried over.

  4. Lack of visibility into admission controllers

    Admission controllers operate only during API requests, which many users never see directly.

The Reality:​

Pod Security Admission only evaluates Pod specifications during API server admission events.

That means:

  • It runs only when a Pod is created or updated

  • It does not monitor, mutate, restart, or kill running Pods

  • Existing Pods are completely ignored unless they are recreated

If a Pod was created before PSA enforcement was enabled, it will:

  • Continue running

  • Keep all its privileges

  • Remain unaffected indefinitely

PSA answers only one question:

“Should this Pod spec be allowed to enter the cluster right now?”

It does not answer:

  • “Is this Pod safe at runtime?”

  • “Is this Pod still compliant?”

  • “Should this Pod be stopped?”

Experiment & Validate​

Step 1: Create an insecure Pod before PSA enforcement

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: privileged-pod
spec:
containers:
- name: app
image: nginx
securityContext:
privileged: true

Apply it:

kubectl apply -f pod.yaml

The Pod runs successfully.

Step 2: Enable Pod Security Admission (restricted)

kubectl label namespace default \
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce=restricted

The Pod will now successfully pull the image and start, proving that registry authentication depends on imagePullSecrets, not ServiceAccount permissions.

Step 3: Observe the existing Pod

kubectl get pod privileged-pod

Result:

  • Pod is still Running

  • No warning

  • No eviction

  • No enforcement action

Step 4: Try creating the same Pod again

kubectl delete pod privileged-pod
kubectl apply -f pod.yaml

Now it fails:

Error: violates PodSecurity "restricted": privileged containers are not allowed

This confirms:

  • PSA blocks new requests

  • PSA ignores existing runtime state

Key Takeaways​

  • Pod Security Admission is not a runtime security mechanism

  • It does not enforce security on running Pods

  • Existing Pods remain untouched until recreated

  • PSA is a preventive guardrail, not a corrective system

  • Runtime security requires additional tools beyond PSA

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